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NATURE AND SOCIAL DESTINY
BY IRA WOODS HOWERTH
""\ TATURE ! We are surrounded and embraced by her; power-
i- 1 less to separate ourselves from her, and powerless to pene-
trate beyond her." So says Goethe. In using the word "Nature,"
it is difficult to avoid the appearance of personification. One of the
earliest objections to the term "Natural Selection" was that it made
of Nature an active power or Deity. But Darwin who coined the
expression explained that he used it metaphorically, and contended
that it was no more objectionable than "elective affinity" as used to
express the seeming preferences of chemical elements in entering
into their various combinations.
We shall here employ the word Nature merely as a blanket term
to cover the world of matter and energy conceived as undetermined
by human intelligence, that is, without the modifications occasioned
by conscious human interference and direction. W^e spell it with
a capital because in this discussion it is of capital importance.
So w^hen in the course of this discussion, it is said, or implied,
that Nature does thus and so, that it has produced this or that, that
it is creative, that it moves toward this or that end, and the like,
w-e mean only to assert that such and such are the results or out-
come of the operation of the totality of forces men generally agree
in calling natural. We have no disposition to discuss, or even to
raise, the question of the origin or ultimate character of these
forces. We are concerned only with their functional aspects ; we
do not go behind the returns. If it is asserted that back of Nature,
or within it, there is an Intelligent Power guiding all its operations,
we enter no denial. Indeed, if called upon we might subscribe, as
to an article of faith, to the assertion that "all things were made
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by Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made."
But ultimate origins are a metaphysical question with which science
has nothing directly to do, and we wish to confine ourselves strictly
within the pale of science. We wish to show clearly a truth about
Nature that is plainly before our eyes, and the social significance
of that truth—not to befog the reader with the mist of speculation.
It is now quite generally believed by all who are entitled to an
opinion on the subject, that our planetary system, the earth and all
it contains, have come into existence by a gradual and orderly pro-
cess commonly known as Evolution. This doctrine of Evolution,
implying as it does that all the phenomena of Nature are strictly
genetic, that is, pushed from behind into their present infinite variety
of adjustments, is obviously fatal to the old and cruder doctrine of
design or teleology, that is, that everything in Nature is perfectlv
adapted to the end it serves. But, as Huxley long ago said, "There
is a wider Teleology, which is not touched by the doctrine of Evolu-
tion, but is actually based upon the fundamental proposition of
Evolution. That proposition is, that the whole world, living and not
living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite
laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primi-
tive nebulosity of the universe was composed. If this be true, it is
no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in the cosmic
vapour; and that a sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge
of the properties of the molecules of that vapour, have predicted,
say the state of the Fauna of Britain in 1869, with as much certainty
as one can say what will happen to the vapour of the breath in
a cold winter's day.^ Thus Huxley asserted, and rightl\- we think,
that "the teleological and mechanical views of nature are not, neces-
sarily, mutually exclusive."
Nature, conceived as a domain of mutually interacting forces,
or as a field of creative energy, has brought into existence our
cosmic system, the world with all its infinite variety of sensible ob-
jects,—"all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth"—and from
the beginning there has been apparently a gradual process of de-
velopment from star-dust to planet ; and since the appearance of
life upon the earth a gradual rise from lower to higher forms.
Natura naturans has produced natura naturata.
1 Essays, Darwiniana, New York, 1898, P. 110. Later Professor Huxley
said with regard to this statement, "I should now like to substitute powers for
'forces.' " See "Life and Letters of Charles Darwin," by F. Darwin, vol. I,
page 555.
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Here, of course, an objection may be interposed. It has not yet
been proved experimentally that life and mind have been produced
by the unaided forces of Nature. There are those who hold to the
doctrine of divine intervention at these two points. But the whole
history of science has been the history of the elimination of creative
or other interferences with the natural order of the phenomena of
Nature.- The miraculous creation of the world in a period of six
days, for instance, has been supplanted by the nebular hypothesis
and its modifications ; the cataclysmic theory of the earth's crust
by the doctrine of uniformitarianism; the doctrine of special crea-
tions of animal and plant forms by the doctrine of descent with
modifications, and the doctrine of divine intervention in the case of
man's origin by the theor}^ of his kinship to the lower and humbler
forms of life. So it may well be held as a tenet of evolutionary
science that nature is one and indivisible, and that natural causes
are all that need to be taken into account for the production of
natural phenomena, not only of the inorganic world, but of the
biological, psychic, and social worlds, as well. xA.t all events science
admits no divine interference with the orderly procedure of Nature
at any time or anywhere. "Life," said Lamarck, "is a purely
physical phenomenon. All its phenomena depend on mechanical,
physical, and chemical causes which are inherent in the nature of
matter itself." Spencer believed that the formation of living matter
took place naturall}' "at a time when the heat of the Earth's surface
was falling through those ranges of temperature at which the higher
organic compounds are unstable." "When we see," he says, "that
the general laws of evolution, as they are exemplified in known
organisms, have been unconsciously conformed to by chemists in the
artificial evolution of organic matter; we can scarcely doubt that
these laws were conformed to in the natural evolution of organic
matter."^ Naegeli declared that "the origin of the organic from
the inorganic is . . . not a question of experience and experiment,
but a fact deduced from the I'aw of the constancy of matter and
force. If all things in the material world are causally related, if all
the phenomena proceed on natural principles, organisms, which are
formed of and decay into the same matter, must have been derived
originally from inorganic compounds." Said Huxley, "If it were
given to me to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time
2 Op. Cit., p. 58.
3 Biology, revised ed.. New York, 1898, pp. 698, 700.
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to the still more remote period when the earth was passing through
physical and chemical conditions which it can no more see again
than a man can recall his infancy, I should expect to be a witness of
the evolution of living protoplasm from non-living matter.""*^ Finally,
to quote a more recently expressed opinion, "Although far from
being able to give a complete scientific explanation of all the
phenomena of life, we have made so much progress towards that
final goal of the evolutionist that we seem fully justified in believing
that the transition from the non-living to the living has indeed oc-
curred, and even in hoping that some day the very origin of life will
be explained."''
These excerpts are sufficient to show the faith of science with
respect to the continuity of the natural process from the non-living
to the living.
As to the origin of mind, the consensus of scientific opinion ij
fairly expressed by a recent writer who, in discussing the relation-
ship of mind and body, says, "whatever one may conceive the ulti-
mate relationship to be, this much is sure : they both develop con-
comitantly out of the egg. Both are the products of natural pro-
cesses and there is no more reason for supposing a miraculous
origin in the one case than in the other."^
Accepting, then, the doctrine that Nature, unaided by creative
intervention, or by man, has produced such marvelous results as we
see in the inorganic, organic, psychic, and social worlds ; and seeing
that the creative tendency has been^ on the whole, progressive, it is
natural to ask, what is the aim or objective toward which the cur-
rent of Nature is flowing? Upon the answer to that question de-
pends, we think, the whole philosophy of life. For, if there is "a
far off divine event" toward which the whole natural creation
moves, the implication is that there is nothing that man is called
upon to do, so far as its ultimate realization is concerned, but to
swim or drift with the current. He may retard or accelerate the
movement, he cannot determine it, or prevent its fulfillment.
"Laissez-faire, laissez-passer," under this view is an inviting phil-
osophy. If, on the other hand, we conclude that nature's objective
bears no relation, or only an accidental relation, to the fulfillment
of human hopes, we are as naturally led to the doctrine of intel-
4 Discourses Biological and Social. New York, 1898, p. 256.
5 "The Evolution of Living Organisms, by E. S. Goodrich, pp. 7-8.
6 H. H. Lane, Evolution and Christian Faith, p. 128-29. Italics his.
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ligent effort as the sole hope of individual and social salvation. The
one vFew leads to optimism or to pessimism, the other to meliorism.
What then is Nature's Aim?
The word aim as commonly employed implies purpose. It means
the thing intended to be hit, the object intended to be affected, or
the act of aiming or directing. To say, then, that Nature has an
aim is to imply that it is conscious, for only a conscious being can
have an aim. But, as we have said. Nature is not a corporate
entity; it is merely the sum of natural phenomena. Now if we take
any one of these phenomena, we find that absence of aim is its char-
acteristic feature. A river does not aim to reach the sea ; an earth-
quake does not aim to shake down buildings ; a cloud does not aim
to condense into rain, nor does the rain aim to fall upon the just
or the unjust; a plant does not aim to bring forth seed; nor an
animal to produce and rear its offspring. If no aim can be found
in any single phenomenon of Nature, it is an obvious conclusion
that there can be no aim in the totality of phenomena included
imder the term Nature.
Nature, then, has no aim. All natural phenomena are unin-
tended.
Still, in Nature we have a domain of change, and change cannot
take place except in some direction. May it not be that this direc-
tion, say a uniform and universal tendency in Nature, has been
divinely predetermined with respect to man's good? Even if it has
no aim. Nature may be "aimed." Here, however, we are brought
face to face with a metaphysical question which science cannot
undertake to answer. And so the scientist is at a disadvantage in
a discussion with the teleologist. To quote Huxley once more, "the
more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he
assume a primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phen-
omena of the universe are the consequences, and the more com-
pletely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always
defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement
was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe.'"^
But turning away from the question, as beyond our reach,
whether Nature is "the result of trains of mechanical dispositions
fixed beforehand by intelligent appointment and kept in action bv
a power at the centre," let us confine ourselves to the mechanism of
^ Darwiniana, p. 112.
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Nature as it reveals itself to scientific investigation, and ask whether
there is a single goal or end towards which Nature is continuously
moving.
According to the generally accepted view of the universe, there
must have been a time when the earth was "without form," and
when, with form, it was "void" ; it contained nothing but inorganic
matter. Later life appeared in lowly creatures, and then, through
incalculable eons,—"the worm mounts through all the spires of
form." Finally man appears, then society and at least the begin-
nings of certain social institutions. On the whole, then, and in
general Nature seems to present a moving picture of progress.
Apart from man's work or will, it appears to be progressive. Hence
a natural law of progress has been inferred, with a perfected type
of man and society as the goal of Nature. This was indeed the
"scientific" conclusion drawn from the first reading of the doctrine
of evolution. Spencer declared that "progress is not an accident,
not a thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity."
Tennyson, "the poet of Evolution," echoed the same idea when he
said,
—
"Yet, I doubt not through the ages one increasing purpose
runs." IMatthew Arnold asserted that "there is a Power outside
ourselves that makes for righteousness." "The world, since the
beginning," says another writer, "has grown toward Good. . . .
From incandescent vapor the world was formed, life appeared, with
its various forms, mind, man, the Universal Alind—all a progress
toward the Benign."'^ Even Alfred Russel Wallace, the codis-
coverer of the principle of Evolution, that is, Natural Selection,
concluded that all Nature has been working "toward a single end,
the development of intellectual, moral and spiritual beings.'"^ "This
earth," he says, "with its infinitude of life and beauty and mystery,
and the universe in the midst of which we are placed, with its over-
vi^helming immensities of suns and nebulae, of light and motion, are
as they are, firstly, for the development of life culminating in man;
secondly, as a vast school house for the higher education of the
human race in preparation for the enduring, spiritual life to which
it is destined. "^^ Life then, as the spirit of Edgar Allen Poe is said
s Stackpoole, H. deVere, The New Optimism, p. 23.
9 The World of Life, p. 341.
1*^ Op. cit., p. 421. Emerson also asserts that "a cultivated man, wise to
know and bold to perform, is the end to which nature works."—Complete
works, vol. VI, p. 53.
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to have declared, is "one eternal progress, with man's good as its
goal."
But while it is true that here in our small corner of the vmiverse
Nature has been, on the whole, progressive, is it also true that it
is so alwavs and everywhere ? The slightest reflection shows that
it is not. The telescope reveals heavenly bodies in the process of
dissolution as well as of integration. The moon, for instance, is a
dead world. Mars has apparently reached the apogee of her de-
velopment. So with numberless stars, they are falling into chaos.
In the world itself natural phenomena reveal the same fact, namely,
that regress is as much a part of Nature as progress. This puzzled
Tennyson.
"Are God and Nature then at strife.
That Nature lends such evil dreams?
So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life ;
"So careful of the type?" but no.
From scarped cliff and quarried stone
She cries, 'A thousand types are gone
:
I care for nothing, all shall go.
'Thou makest thine appeal to me
:
I bring to life, I bring to death';"
What assurance have we, then, that in our own little corner of
the universe eternal progress is guaranteed to us by Nature? None
whatever. She brings to life, she brings to death. "Suppose, for
example," said Huxley, "a return of the glacial epoch, and a spread
of polar climatal conditions over the globe. The operation of
natural selection under these circumstances would tend on the whole,
to the weeding out of the higher organisms, and the cherishing of
the lower forms of life. Cryptogamic vegetation would have the
advantage over Phanerogamic ; Hydrozoa over Corals ; Crustacea
over Insects, and Amphipoda and Isopoda over the higher Crusta-
cea ; Cetaceans and Seals over the Primates : the civilization of the
Esquimaux over that of the European. "^^ Nothing is plainer to
even ordinary observation than the fact that Nature involves regres-
sive as well as progressive phenomena, that Evolution and Progress
are not identical terms. Nature creates the parasite as well as the
1^ Darwiniana, p. 91.
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paragon. Many of her darlings are deformed. The doctrine of
evolution is consistent with gradual progress, with indefinite persist-
ence in one state, or with a gradual retrogression. If we should
look down from an aeroplane upon the ocean, we should see all
sorts of tide and wave movements, movements in every direction,
all dependent upon the set or direction of the incident forces.
Nature on the whole presents exactly the same aspect, a multiplicity
of directions and a multiplicity of goals.
But how are we to account for the long natural progress culmin-
ating in man? We may as well ask, "How are we to account for
the long natural regress apparent in Mars or the Moon. Since
Nature is a congeries of universal and, from our viewpoint, blind
forces operating in every possible direction, progressive phenomena
in one part of the universe are as necessary, and no more to be
wondered at than regressive phenomena in another part of the
universe. As a matter of fact Nature knows nothing of progress
or regress ; they are human concepts. Man, however, naturally
regards as progressive the cosmic movement that has resulted in
himself. But what about all the sentient creatures, in this world
or in others, that may have happened to be in the backwash of
Nature, so to speak, and have been eliminated? Ephemera in a
current of air, if intelligent enough to do so, might, probably would,
interpret their general movement as a continuous progress that
should awaken wonder, but the succeeding generation might find
the wind blowing in another direction. From the viewpoint of in-
finite time, the existence of mankind is ephemeral.
All that we need to ask, then, is what is the direction and ob-
jective of Nature in this infinitesimal part of the universe known
as the world? Lester F. Ward in concluding a discussion of this
question, says, "We may therefore probably say with some approach
toward the truth that the object of nature, as the phrase has been
explained, is to convert as large an amount as possible of inorganic
into organic and organized matter. This may be a somewhat un-
poetical conclusion, and if we could have things as we want them a
more delicate and respectable end might be imagined for nature to
pursue. But we are only trying to ascertain what the end really is
toward which things tend, and this formula comes nearer to ex-
pressing it than any other that has been offered."^^ Ward thus
describes "the end toward which matters seem to be moving in an
12 "Ward, Lester F., Pure Sociology, p. 114.
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ascending series of creative acts such as we observe in our part of
the universe at the present stage of cosmic evolution." But while
it may be possible to discover some single and general objective in
Nature "in our part of the universe at the present stage of cosmic
evolution," there are also numerous specific objectives, and in an-
other part and at another stage there will be other objectives. An
appreciation of this fact led Gabriel Tarde to remark, "there is
no single end in nature—no end in relation to which all others are
means; but there is an infinite number of ends."^^ This must be
true for the reasons we have given. Nature presents, and must
present, the aspect of moving toward innumerable ends, for it in-
volves a multiplicity of forces and an infinite variety of movements.
Each of these movements, however, has an end or goal and a very
prosaic one. It is rest, cessation of motion,—equilibrium or balance
of forces, as it is expressed in the physical world,—adjustment or
adaptation to the environment, as it is called in the biological and
social world. The goal of Nature, then, whether taken as a whole
or with respect to any specific natural phenomenon is balance or
equilibrium.
This conception is, of course, a commonplace in the physical
and biological sciences. The natural physical world consists of a
practically infinite number of phenomena, of which the movements
of the winds and waves and tides are typical examples. In the case
of any such movements it is plain that the end or goal is equilibrium,
that is, rest and cessation of movement. The primitive man in-
terpreted all such natural phenomena in terms of his own welfare.
But modern science sees only the operation of unchanging forces
under invariable laws. So also with natural biological phenomena,
the phenomena of life apart from purposive acts; the end is adjust-
ment. Life itself is only "a continuous adjustment of internal to
external relations." An organism lives only so long as the adjust-
ment is maintained, that is, only so long as there is an approximate
equilibrium of the forces acting upon and within the organism. If
we consider the phenomena of species creation and development,
the same thing is true. In general, with respect to the fauna and
flora of the various parts of the world, this end is approximately
reached. Man, however, being himself a force, disturbs the balance,
without, as a rule, foreseeing the consequences. But when the
balance is disturbed a movement at once takes place which is
13 "Tarde, G., Social Laws, English translation. New York, 1898.
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identical in principle to the restoration of balance in a pair of scales
when its equilibrium is disturbed. When the organism or the
species affected becomes once more adapted to its environment, the
movement ceases. The end or goal of Xature in the biological
world, also, is adjustment, adaptation, equilibrium.
It is so with the natural phenomena of mind. The most ortho-
dox theologian would perhaps find no fault with the declaration that
the mind craves rest, and he would perhaps be ready to prescribe
the particular set of beliefs that will assure that desirable condition.
But whether the mind craves rest or not, it is plain that the natural
phenomena of mind are just the same with respect to their tendency
as other natural phenomena ; they move toward equilibration. That
is their goal.
Natural social phenomena are no exception. And here let it be
remembered that natural social phenomena include not merely the
accidental in society, as it is ordinarily conceived, but also all social
phenomena that are not intelligently directed toward a social end.
From the highest viewpoint, that is the viewpoint of world order
and world progress, almost the whole realm of social phenomena
are in the natural sphere. Just as the phenomena of individual life,
no matter how consciously directed in the interest of the individual
himself, are often wholly undirected as viewed from the standpoint
of the life of the group, so group life, say national life, is often
directed with not the slightest conscious reference to the life of the
race. From that viewpoint, that is, the general social viewpoint,
such phenomena are without direction ; they are purely natural. In
all this wide realm, social movements are in the direction of social
equilibriiun and are as indififerent to the well-being of the race as
the movements of the clouds or the roll of the sea. This goal, or
rather these goals, in themselves have no more reference to, or
respect for, man's well-being than the end of motion in a falling
stone or a spouting geyser. In all natural phenomena, hence in
Nature itself, the goal is the same. It is rest, balance, equilibrium,
adjustment.
This may at first sight be regarded as a discouraging situation,
but now let us look closely at the real significance of this fact with
respect to man and society.
The characteristic distinction between living and inert matter
is that, roughly speaking, the former acts, while the latter is acted
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Upon. "Tendency to equilibrium of force and to permanence of
form," said Huxley, "are the characters of that portion of the uni-
verse which does not live—the domain of the chemist and physicist.
Tendency to disturb existing equilibrium, to take on forms which
succeed one another in definite cycles—is the character of the living
world. '"^"^ Disturbance of Nature, then, is an inevitable though not
an exclusive function of everxthing that lives. Any disturbance
^\ithout a conscious purpose belongs in the realm of the natural.
Natural disturbances must aft'ect for good or ill the well-being of
the organism. Obviously disturbances whose effects are calculated
in advance, and are thus intelligently predetermined, are most likely
to affect the organism advantageously. Such disturbances, how-
ever, imply and require mind. The function of mind, then, is to
direct in the interest of the organism all changes in the environ-
ment, that is, in Nature. In man mind reaches its highest level. It
is the special prerogative of man, therefore, to disturb natural
equilibria most effectively in his own interest, individually and
collectively, and to determine by changing the environment their
restoration at a higher level. The absence of purpose in Nature
makes Nature wholly subservient to man.
Suppose, however, that Nature were relatively active not
passive ? Is it not obvious that man's power to improve his condi-
tion would be limited if not destroyed? His peculiar power lies
just in the fact that he can disturb the equilibria of nature, and
determine by his intelligence the conditions in which, when re-
established, the new equilibria may be, from the viewpoint of his
well-being, at higher levels. So it would appear that Nature, blind,
unconscious, indifferent to the fare and the fate of man, is just
what man w-ould wish it to be from the standpoint of his well-being.
The sooner he perceives this, the sooner may he devote himself
wholeheartedly to the study of natural phenomena in order to con-
trol them in his own interest and thus improve his condition.
As with man so also with society, which is collective man. ^Nlan
has been slow to perceive that natural law prevails without excep-
tion in the realm of the unintended phenomena in society exactly as
it prevails in all the other phenomena of Nature. "The conception
of natural law,'' says Spencer, "which does not exist in the savage,
is as yet but rudimentary in the civilized." But most civilized men
are ready to acknowledge that the whole physical world is a domain
1-1 Op. cit. p. 43.
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of natural law. Many will agree that natural law prevails also in
the field of natural biological and psychic phenomena. But few
as yet perceive, and are ready to acknowledge, that society itself to
the extent that it is not brought under human direction is also a
domain of law. Law is as rigid and as universal in the undirected
phenomena of human society as it is in the field of natural psychic,
biological, and physical phenomena. The scope of the field of
natural social phenomena will not be appreciated, or the full signifi-
cance of the truth about Nature that we have been emphasizing be
apprehended, unless it is seen that social evolution has thus far been
almost wholly without direction. "It is true," said Spencer, "that
much social evolution is achieved without any intention on the part
of the citizens to achieve it, and even without the consciousness
that they are achieving it, the entire industrial organization in all
its marvelous complexity, has arisen from the pursuit by each
person of his own interests, subject to certain restraints imposed
by corporate society; and by this same spontaneous action have
arisen also the multitudinous appliances of industry, science and
art, from flint knives up to automatic printing machines, from
sledges up to locomotives—a fact which might teach politicians
that there are at work far more potent social agencies than those
which they control. "^^ Now, since all social evolution achieved
without intention belong in the realm of Nature, this passage from
Spencer may help the reader to perceive the fact just pointed out
that society and social evolution are yet almost wholly without di-
rection. "Civilized man," says Lester F. Ward, "although he has
learned not only to avert the dangers of the physical forces but even
to subjugate and utilize them has made no progress with social
forces, and looks upon the passions precisely as the savage looks
upon the tornado. Alan is only civilized in relation to the lower
and simpler phenomena. Toward the higher and more complex
phenomena he is still a savage. He has no more thought of con-
trolling, much less utilizing, the social forces than the savage has of
controlling or utilizing the thunderbolt. Just as pestilences were
formerly regarded as scourges of God, so the so-called evil pro-
pensities of man, which are nothing but manifestations of social
energy, are still looked upon as necessary inflictions which may be
preached against but must be endured. This difference is wholly
due to the fact that while we now have sciences of ph}sics,
15 Various Fragments, New York, 1897, p. 132.
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chemistry, geology, and bacteriology, which teach the true nature
of storms, electricity, gases, earthquakes, and disease germs, we
have no science of social psychology or sociology that teaches the
true nature of human motives, desires, and passions or of social
wants and needs and the psychic energy working for their satisfac-
tion. The sociologist who has a proper conception of his science
as similar in all essential respects to these other sciences, and as
having, like them, a practical purpose and use for man, looks upon
the social forces as everybody looks upon the physical and vital
forces, and sees in them powers of nature now doing injury, or at
least running to waste, and perceives that, as in the other case, they
may. by being first studied and understood, be rendered harmless
and ultimately converted into the servants of man, and harnessed,
as the lightning has been harnessed, to the on-going chariot of
civilization. "^'^
Natural phenomena, then, including natural changes in society,
may be t\pified by the ocean, society by the crew and passengers
on a ship. If these, each in pursuit of his own ends, allow the ship
to drift with the natural forces of wind and tide, they may by
chance reach the harbor. i>ut they are more likely to be caught in
an adverse current and swept on the rocks. If. perceiving their
danger, they rely upon the natural aim and tendency of nature to
save them from destruction, their reliance is likely to be in vain.
Prayer will not save them. Providence will not interfere. They may
cry aloud and the only echo will be their wailing cry. Their only
certain hope of salvation is an accurate knowledge of the sea and
of navigation, and steady hands upon the wheel. The only boon,
aside from the materials and forces of nature, that man should ask
is the power he now has, namely, the power of self-direction and
the direction of social evolution.
The secret and assurance of continuous human progress, then,
is not any fixed aim or goal in Nature. It is not in Nature at all,
but in Mind. The beneficence of Nature lies not in some inevitable
destiny inherent in its operations, some far off divine event to which
it moves by virtue of its resident forces, but in its marvelous and
abundant materials and forms of energy, all of which are at the
service of man's intelligence, enabling him to realize the divine event
formulated b\' him as his own objective. \\'hen man fails, it is be-
cause of ignorance or want of knowledge, not because of fate or
i'^ Pure Sociology, p. 110.
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miracle. The only assurance of material success is scientific knowl-
edge of the materials and forces of Nature. The only assurance of
moral success is the same, coupled with the emotional stimulus of
a moral ideal. Man, individually and collectively, must think out
and work out his own destiny. Collectively he has hardly begun
this process. Men are intelligent but Mankind is a fool—and na-
tions are little better. They spend money for battleships instead of
education and in schemes for the promotion of international good-
will, which would make protection unnecessar}-. They send ineffec-
tive punitive expeditions into neighboring countries that cost more
than enough to establish colleges in all their cities of considerable
size. They go to war and destroy enough lives and propert\- to
make all the waste places of the earth to blossom as the rose. Thev
turn the knowledge and instruments of individual achievements in
science to their own destruction, and then call upon God to save
them from their own folly. Without any intelligent concerted
efifort to direct their own evolution toward a worthy end, they talk
of "manifest destiny,'' and imagine they displa}' superior piet\' by
depending upon a divine Providence that rules and overrules in the
affairs of nations, instead of depending upon themselves. Nations,
like individuals, make their own beds ; they must lie in them. They
may and should determine their own destiny. There may be a Di-
vinity, but there is no divinity that "shapes our ends, rough hew
them how we will." There is no power outside of ourseKes that
unerringly makes for righteousness. Now and then the accidental
operation of natural forces do so. But man, and man alone,
equipped with scientific knowledge of society, and inspired by a
scientific social ideal, can determine social destiny. ^lan, if he did
but realize it, is himself a god.
The prevalent conception, then, of social progress through an
inevitable movement and aim in Nature, or through divine de-
termination of natural phenomena, or divine interference with
natural laws, is poor science. May we not say also that it is poor
theology. It has not the religious value it has been supposed to
have. The theologian turned historian, or the historian turned
theologian, has often pictured the whole stream of natural phe-
nomena, particularly the natural social phenomena of recorded his-
tory, as converging toward his own cult or his own nation. Occa-
sional and dramatic events, and these alone, are pointed to as evi-
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dences of divine interference. The doctrine of such interferences
he calls, "God in history." Such a doctrine, however, is a concep-
tion suited only to the philosophy of primitive man. The expres-
sion has generally conveyed the idea of special providence, that is
divine interference as manifested in some particular act. ISut ma\
not Providence be regarded as general not special ? May it not be
that the beneficence of the Creator is manifested in the unchanging
character of natural laws, the inevitable tendency of all natural
phenomena to a state of equilibrium by which alone Xature, all
Nature, is made subservient to man's intelligence ?
Such at least is a reasonable tenet of the religion of science.
Religion is not fuddling with the mysterious. It does not neces-
saril}' involve concern about "the other world." ( )ne world at a
time ! True religion, practical religion, is at least a provisional ac-
ceptance of the scientific view of Xature and of Mind, a love for
the highest ethical ideal that the mind of man has been able to con-
ceive and formulate, and consecration to the task of realizing that
ideal here in this world through the utilization of the materials and
forces of X'ature in intelligent human effort. Prayer from this
view, is concentration, conservation and consecration.
In conclusion we may say, it is disloyalty to science as well as
to art to set any limit to man's potential control of Nature, and it
is a reflection upon the Divine Beneficence to declare, as many do.
that there are forces operating in society which man ma\' not con-
trol and direct. What a vista that opens for future human achieve-
ment !
"So many worlds, so much to do.
So little done, such things to be!"
